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Regulation and the Collapse of the New Deal Order
or
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Market
Reuel Schiller*
DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT CITE OR CIRCULATE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE
AUTHOR
It is not your typical book on public administration that makes the best seller list and
bears a cover blurb from the President of the United States. Indeed, Reinventing Government:
How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming Government may be the only such book.
Written by David Osborne, a public policy analyst, and Ted Gaebler, a professional city
manager, Reinventing Government spent eight weeks as a New York Times best seller in the
spring of 1992. It was Bill Clinton who was quoted on the cover of first paperback edition,
released less than two weeks after his inauguration: “Should be read by every elected official in
America. This book gives us the blueprint.”1
Reinventing Government was an influential book. Its prescriptions provided the
framework for the Democratic Party’s attempts to reform the federal administrative apparatus in
the 1990s. The book’s basic policy commitments – a reconceptualization of citizens as
consumers, the use of market mechanisms in place of governmental directives, and the
*
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For Bill Clinton’s blurb, see the 1993 paperback edition of David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing
Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector (New York: Plume, 1993). All the
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the New York Times best seller list for seven weeks from April 12, 1992 to May 24th, 1992. It peaked at number 8.
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substitution of private institutions for state actors – came to define what the post-New Deal
regulatory order aspired to.2 These ideas represented an abandonment of the basic premises of
regulation that stemmed from the New Deal. Gone was a commitment to policy created by
federal experts. Gone was a suspicion of the ability of the free market to successfully structure
the American economy. Indeed, in many instances, gone was the idea that government should
act as a countervailing force to markets at all.
This chapter will examine the emergence of this new, post-New Deal conception of the
role of the administrative state, often called “The New Governance.”3 I will first describe the
policy premises of the New Deal administrative state and contrast them with the underlying
assumptions of the New Governance. In doing so, I will explain how the ideas that permeated
the New Governance shaped regulatory policy in the 1990s and 2000s. I will then explore the
reasons for the rise of this new conception of the administrative state. In particular, I will
demonstrate that the New Governance had its origins not only in conservative attacks on the
premises of the New Deal Order, but also from the left’s powerful critique of the postwar liberal
state.

*

*

*
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The vision of regulation that I will discuss in detail are frequently given the moniker “neoliberalism.” I
have declined to do so in this chapter. I have made this choice because the word is too often used to avoid defining
the specifics of what was happening in fin-de-siècle politics and political culture, kind of like a bedspread thrown
over an unmade bed. The goal of this chapter is to describe the specific elements of regulatory thought and action at
the end of the century. I will leave it to others to place these elements within a broader definition of neoliberalism.
3

I recognize that there is a very broad range of scholars and policy-makers whose work might be placed
within the category of the New Governance. Not all of this work has the focus on market mechanisms that
characterizes the material that this chapter will discuss. See, for example, Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon,
“Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State,” Georgetown Law Journal 100 (2011): 53.

2

If you had to pick a single document to encapsulate the New Deal’s vision of the
administrative state, the obvious choice would be James Landis’ 1938 book, The Administrative
Process.4 Landis – the Dean of Harvard Law School who had drafted the New Deal’s securities
legislation and had chaired the Securities and Exchange Commission5 -- wrote the Administrative
Process as a full-throated defense of the administrative state at a time when the New Deal’s
political opponents were regaining sufficient political strength to attack some of its fundamental
assumptions. As such, it forcefully articulated the two main premises of New Deal regulation:
First, the Depression demonstrated that a society could not depend on market mechanisms to
ensure a stable, productive economy. Second, as a consequence of that fact, the federal
government had to establish an administrative apparatus, staffed by experts, to manage economic
matters.
According to Landis, the rise of an industrial, technologically advanced society marked
the end of a time when free markets could be expected to meet the needs of the members of that
society. “A world that . . . could listen to Wordsworth’s denunciation of railroads because their
building despoiled the beauty of his northern landscapes is different, very different, from one that
in 1938 has to determine lanes and flight levels for air traffic.”6 In such a context, “laissez-faire
– the simple belief that only good could come by giving economic forces free play – came to an

4

James M. Landis, The Administrative Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938). For a more
detailed discussion of the premises of New Deal Administration, see Reuel Schiller, “The Era of Deference: Courts,
Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law,” Michigan Law Review 106 (2007): 399, 413-21.
5

For biographical information on James Landis see Justin O'Brien, The Triumph, Tragedy and Lost Legacy
of James M. Landis: A Life on Fire (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014); Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation
(Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1984), 153-209; and Donald A. Ritchie, James M. Landis: Dean of the
Regulators (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1980).
6

Landis, The Administrative Process, 7.
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end.”7 Indeed, according to Landis, a belief in the efficacy of markets was so obsolete by the
1930s that he wrote merely of its “remnants.”8
Many of Landis’s fellow New Dealers were even blunter. Market mechanisms might
have worked to ensure a productive economy in the nineteenth-century world of small
businesses, but the Depression had revealed, in the words of Jerome Frank, “a new economic
epoch” in which giant corporations were not subject to the traditional constraints of competition.9
The most detailed description of this phenomenon was in Adolph Berle and Gardner Means’s
1932 book, The Modern Corporation and Private Property,10 but this rejection of the laissezfaire assumptions of classical economics was central to the thinking of most New Dealers. “The
jig is up,” wrote Rex Tugwell. “The cat is out of the bag. There is no invisible hand. There
never was. If the depression has not taught us that, we are incapable of education.”11 Landis’
mentor, Felix Frankfurter, agreed. “We have been assuming a continuing vitality for the
economic theories of pioneer America while fact has been steadily undermining theory.”12
Having identified mindless obeisance to outdated notions of capitalism as the problem
behind the Depression, Landis and other intellectuals within the Roosevelt administration set
about devising solutions. Expert administration, Landis believed, was the key. It was the only
possible way for government to regulate the modern economy effectively:
7

Id., 8.

8

Id., 10.

9

Jerome Frank, Book Review of Adolph A. Berle and Gardner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property, Yale Law Journal 42 (1933): 989.
10

Adolph Adolph A. Berle and Gardner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (rev.
edition, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1968) (1932). The failure of markets is the theme of this entire book. For a
particularly good passage see page 308.
11

Rexford G. Tugwell, The Battle for Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935), 14

12

Felix Frankfurter, “What We Confront in American Life,” in Archibald MacLeish and E. F. Prichard,
Jr.,,eds., Law and Politics: The Occasional Papers of Felix Frankfurter, 1913-1938 (New York: Harcourt, Brace,
1939), 336.
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With the rise of regulation, the need for expertness became dominant; for the art of
regulating an industry requires knowledge of the details of its operation, ability to shift
requirements as the condition of the industry may dictate, the pursuit of energetic
measures upon the appearance of an emergency, and the power through enforcement to
realize conclusions as to policy.13
Book after book written by New Deal policy-makers and intellectuals sang the praises of expert
planners.14 The governmental process, Frankfurter wrote, was no longer a place for amateurs:
"Compelled to grapple with a world more and more dominated by technological forces,
government must have at its disposal the resources of training and capacity equipped to
understand and deal with the complicated issues to which these technological forces give rise.”15
Indeed, government without expertise was a recipe for demagoguery. Only "quiet, detached"
experts could separate "facts from fiction" and determine "what [was] proof and what surmise.”
This process would generate a politics designed "to reach the mind rather than to exploit
feeling.”16
There was never any question among New Dealers that locus of much of this policymaking expertise would be the federal government and that agencies would exercise “that full
ambit of authority necessary . . . to plan, to promote, and to police. . . .”17. American economic
institutions were so large that only regulatory agencies with a similarly vast scope could possibly
be up to the task of managing them. Consequently, Landis and other New Deal policy-makers
envisioned a concentration of power in federal administrative agencies that would regulate from
13

Landis, The Administrative Process, 15.

14

In addition to Berle and Means and Landis, see Henry Wallace, New Frontiers: A Study of the Mind of
American and What Lays Ahead (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1934); Tugwell, The Battle for Democracy;
Rexford G. Tugwell, The Industrial Discipline and the Governmental Arts (New York: Columbia University Press,
1933); and Felix Frankfurter, The Public and Its Government (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1930).
15

Frankfurter, The Public and Its Government, 151.

16

Id., 153.

17

Landis, The Administrative Process, 17.
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the top down (“like a trusted private executive,” Tugwell wrote) to ensure that both specific
industries could be controlled and that issues that transcended individual industries could be
addressed.18
Written after the demise of the New Deal Order, Reinventing Government had a very
different take on the efficacy of markets and the role of government. The book’s premise was
that the bureaucratic government established during the New Deal was broken. It was
inefficient, expensive, and unable to carry out the basic functions that people demanded of it.
This had happened because the American state was trying to use top-down, bureaucratized, New
Deal models of governance in a society that was too complex to be governed in such a fashion.
Yet another “new epoch” had dawned.
The solution to this problem was not mindless deregulation. Osborne and Gaebler
understood the lessons of the Great Depression. Society had become too complex for the night
watchman state. That is why both public and private bureaucracies developed. Society, however,
did not stop developing once the twentieth-century administrative state was in place. Instead,
change continued. Indeed, it sped up. National markets became global markets. Consumer
choices multiplied. Business structures changed. Information coursed through new channels.
According to Osborne and Gaebler, by the 1970s, America had arrived at a point of crisis similar
to the 1930s: the bureaucratic state that had developed during the first two-thirds of the
twentieth century was completely out of step with the economic and social reality of modern
America.19 The solution to this problem was to reinvent government, eschewing both the
nihilistic libertarianism of the right and the myopic commitment to bureaucracy of the left.

18

Landis, Administrative Process, 14-17; Rexford G. Tugwell, “The Ideas behind the New Deal,” New
York Times Magazine, July 16th, 1933, 1.
19

Id., 12-16

6

Osborne and Gaebler’s suggestions for reinvention have become commonplace in today’s
policy world. The state was to adopt the nostrums of 1980s management consulting. It was to
achieve “Total Quality Management” by calculating return on investment for government
programs. Citizens should be viewed as “consumers” of government services. Front line
workers should be empowered, bureaucratic hierarchies destroyed. Hard, coercive enforcement
of regulations should be replaced with cooperative, collaborative implementation. Most
significantly, market mechanisms should be introduced into the governmental process as much
as possible. The state should adopt market-driven approaches for both service provision and
regulation. It should use more flexible private actors to carry out state functions when possible,
or at least compete with those actors so as to reduce cost and increase efficiency. The state
should enter the market to replace revenue streams that would traditionally have come from
taxes. Tax and spend should become earn and incentivize.
Reinventing Government’s tremendous influence stemmed from the fact that it became
the must read book within the Clinton administration. Days after taking office, Clinton asked his
Vice President, Al Gore, lead a “National Performance Review” (NPR) in order “reinvent
government.”20 Osborne was the “intellectual guidepost” the project, known as “REGO.”21
Within 180 days the NPR produced its recommendations (From Red Tape to Results), and by the

20

The National Performance Review released three major reports: From Red Tape to Results: Creating a
Government that Works Better and Costs Less, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993); Putting
Customers First: Standards for Serving the American People (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1994); and Common Sense Government: Works Better and Costs Less (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1995). For the history of the National Performance Review, see Common Sense Government, 1.
The library of the University of North Texas maintains and excellent digital archive of NPR materials.
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/status/ex.sum.html. This includes a brief history of the NPR.
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/papers/bkgrd/brief.html.
21

John Kamensky, “The U.S. Reform Experience: The National Performance Review,”
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/papers/bkgrd/kamensky.html. Kamensky was the Assistant to the Deputy
Director of Management of the Office of Management and Budget during the Clinton administration. As such, he
oversaw the REGO project.

7

end of 1995, the administration was ready to declare victory, though consistent with the rhetoric
of dynamic change that permeated the policy dialogue, no one was gauche enough to suggest that
the project was done.
Many of the recommendations were only tangentially related to new modes of
governance. Some simply read like a rejiggering of substantive policy preferences (or a shift in
interest group power that came with a change in political control of the White House): “End
Wool and Mohair Subsidy,” “Increase Access to Capital for Minority Businesses.”22 Others
were anodyne procedural or institutional changes designed to promote efficiency that would have
been equally pleasing to New Dealers and late twentieth century reformers: “Create a Single
Point of Contact for Program and Grant Information,” “Automate Processing of ERISA Annual
Financial Reports.”23 Many recommendations, however, sought to implement the tenets of New
Governance that went beyond a simple and uncontroversial preference for a streamlined
bureaucracy. One manifestation of this was a change in vocabulary that was, presumably, meant
to reflect a change in mindset. Many programs were to be “reinvented.”24 All programs were
supposed to become responsive and “customer-driven.”25 Indeed, the word “customers”
replaced words such as “citizens,” “beneficiaries,” or “persons” that might have appeared in a
more traditional government document.26
This focus on consumers had a substantive dimension as well. The NPR’s
recommendations reconceptualized many programs, demanding that they produce revenues like

22

From Red Tape to Results, 134, 136.

23

Id., 137, 146.

24

The introduction to the NPR’s first report detailed how agencies were asked to “create Reinvention
Teams” and “Reinvention Laboratories.”, id., i.
25

Id., 140.

26

NPR’s second report was entitled Putting Customers First: Standards for Serving the American People.
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a business. Thus, national parks should be run in an “entrepreneurial” fashion.27 Similarly,
rather than funding its activities out of general revenue, the federal government should charge
fees for particular services it provides, from air traffic control to veterans’ hospitals.28 Other
service provision should be rendered more efficient through public/private competition or simply
through outsourcing. Be it the Department of Defense, NASA, the Bureau of Prisons, the Civil
Conservation Corps, the Department of Energy, or the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, the discipline of the market would reinvent administration, slashing or eliminating
bureaucracy, improving customer experiences, and preserving the public fisc.29
The NPR’s recommendations were not limited to agencies that distributed specific
government benefits. They also embraced the regulatory activities of the federal government.
First of all, the NPR recommended, tentatively, market-based forms of regulation that would
become all the rage in the early years of the new millennium.30 The primary regulatory
innovation that it promoted, however, was collaborative, “softer” methods of regulatory
enforcement. Negotiated rulemaking, alternative dispute resolution, and “self-inspections”
should replace traditional, top down, command, inspect, and punish methods of regulatory
enforcement. This was particularly prevalent in the NPR’s recommendations for the Department
of Labor, the agency frequently held up as the paradigmatic agency in need of reinvention.31 But

27

From Red Tape to Results, 143.

28

Id., 150 (air traffic control), 153 (Veterans administration). See also, 135 (fisheries), 136 (Department of
Defense), 137 (Department of Energy), 141 (Food and Drug Administration), 146 (Department of Labor), and 148
(Small Business Administration).
29

Id., 135 (Department of Commerce), 136 (Department of Defense), 138 (Department of Energy), 139
(Environmental Protection Agency), 142 (Deparment of Housing and Urban Development), 145 (Bureau of
Prisons), 146 (Civilian Conservation Corps), 147 (NASA).
30

Id., 139 (“EPA should work with Congress to propose language amending the Clean Water Act to
explicitly encourage market-based approaches to reduce water pollution.”) For contemporary examples of the
proliferation of this type of regulation, see notes 38, 39, 40.
31

Id., 146

9

the Department of Transportation and the Internal Revenue Service were also targeted for this
type of reform.32
This commitment to the mechanisms of New Governance was not a one-time thing
limited to the Clinton administration. Many of these reforms – market-based service provision,
regulatory flexibility, revenue-generating, entrepreneurial government, public/private
partnerships – had become quite common in states and localities throughout the 1980s.33 The
very same document that crowed about the successes of the first round of REGO proposed much
more of the same.34 Flexible, collaborative enforcement mechanisms were used with increasing
frequency in the 1990s and 2000s, particularly at the U.S. Department of Labor, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the
U.S. Department of Agriculture.35 Similarly, New Governance’s calls for examining the “return
on investment” of government programs was put into effect by the vigorous and widespread
adoption of cost/benefit measures into the very structure of the administrative state. Executive
Orders promulgated by Ronald Reagan, and enthusiastically continued by every subsequent

32

Id., 149, 152.

33

Descriptions of the use of these mechanisms in state and local government are the primary focus of
Reinventing Government. “As we researched [Reinventing Government],” Osborne and Gaebler wrote, “we were
astounded by the degree of change taking place in our cities, counties, states, and school districts.” Reinventing
Government, xxii. Gaebler himself was a city manager.
34

Common Sense Government, 119-43.

35

For these specific examples see, Orley Lobel, “The Renew Deal. The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought,” Minn. L. Rev. 89 (2005-2005): 410-15 (Department of Labor), 41519 (Occupational Safety and Health Administration), 424-32 (Environmental Protection Agency); and Beryl A.
Radin, et al., New Governance for Rural America: Creating Intergovernmental Relationships (Lawrence, Ks.:
University of Kansas Press, 1996). For an encyclopedic list of New Governance initiatives across dozens of policy
areas, see Lester M. Salamon, ed., The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002).
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administration regardless of party, required that cost/benefit analysis be conducted on every
significant federal regulation.36
The idea that the provision of government services should be reconceptualized as a
market-driven process had also become commonplace by the beginning of the twenty-first
century. Debates about education policy, for example, sought to improve school performance by
explicitly invoking markets through “school choice” policies such as vouchers, charter schools,
and No Child Left Behind’s right of parents to remove their children from underperforming
schools.37 The 1990s also saw market mechanisms introduced into regulation of traditional
communications technology and the internet,38 and, in the early twenty-first century, the
Affordable Care Act was premised on the idea that the key to achieving universal health
coverage and reducing its cost was to create marketplaces for healthcare and then force people
to buy from them.39
Furthermore, each of these methods of providing government benefits through the market
was designed to have a regulatory effect as well as a distributional one. Not only did creating a
market in health insurance or schools result in the most efficient distribution of these public

36

For the extensive and continuing use of executive orders mandating presidential control of rulemaking,
see Elena Kagan, “Presidential Administration,” Harvard Law Review 114 (2001): 2246, 2277-81, 2285-2290. For
specific cost benefit requirements, see Executive Order 12291 (February 17, 1981), sections 2(b), 3(d); Executive
Order 12866 (October 4, 1993), section 1(b)(6). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: Humanizing the Regulatory
State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014). the 1980s. For an intellectual history of the use of cost/benefit
analysis from the Regan-era to the present, see Jeremy K. Kessler and David E. Pozen, “Working Themselves
Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of Legal Theories,” University of Chicago Law Review (forthcoming), 140-49.
37

The No Child left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. Law No.107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001), particularly Title
V; Paul E. Peterson, ed., The Future of School Choice (Palo Alto, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 2003); Michael
Mintrom, Policy Entrepreneurs and School Choice (Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2000).
38

Communications Act of 1996, Pub. Law No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996); Lobel, “The Renew
Deal,”436-38; Thomas J. Duesterberg and Kenneth Gordon, Competition and Deregulation in Telecommunications:
The Case for a New Paradigm (Indianapolis, In.: Hudson Institute Press, 1997).
39

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. Law No. 11-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), particularly

subtitle D.
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goods, it also disciplined the actors in these markets in a manner that was more efficient than
command and control regulation. Providers would conform to regulatory goals (student
achievement requirements, for example) not because the government told them to, but because
consumers/citizens would not chose their product if they do not.
This idea that markets could substitute for direct government action as a mechanism to
achieve a regulatory end arose in other policy areas as well. The most obvious was
environmental protection, where state and federal actors increasingly employed emissions
trading markets to reduce pollutants and greenhouse gases.40 Container deposit laws also sought
to harness market mechanisms to reduce solid waste. More generally, the end of the twentieth
century and the beginning of the twenty-first century saw a massive growth of disclosure
requirements, often as a substitute for enforceable substantive regulatory requirements. The
number of public policy problems that policymakers sought to solve through disclosure in the
1990s and the 2000s is too numerous to count: securities regulation, consumer regulation in
every possible product area from children’s toys to healthcare, internet privacy, public health,
real estate transactions.41 Indeed, cost/benefit analysis, traditionally a bête noir of the left, was
embraced across the political spectrum with very little controversy as liberals reconceptualized it
as an element of the ideal disclosure regime.42 Thus, the most common regulatory strategy of the
new millennium was based on the presumption that fully-informed consumers would make
choices in the market that punished businesses that did not meet aspirational, non-enforceable

40

See, for example, Salamon, Tools of Government, 255-56, 267-68, 279; and Roger K. Raufer and
Stephen L. Feldman, Acid Rain and Emissions Trading: Implementing a Market Approach to Pollution Control
(New York: Rowan and Littlefield, 1987).
41

Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure of Mandated
Disclosure (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2014).
42

Kessler and Pozen, “Working Themselves Impure,” 140-49.
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regulatory goals. Indeed, in the tech utopian fringes of the modern economy, disclosure plus the
massive information spreading potential of digital technologies was thought to eliminate the need
for any government regulation at all.43
Of course, this sort of market-based regulation and the other mechanisms of the New
Governance did not entirely replace more traditional bureaucracies and command and control
regulation. They did, however, have a profound effect on the contours of the American
regulatory state. Since the 1990s, they have been implemented with increasing frequency.
Additionally, policies associated with New Governance have come to dominate the debate about
how to form and reform the administrative state. It will be a long time before the instruments of
state that were created during the New Deal disappear, if they ever do. But the ideas that
underlay them -- that experts should craft policy, that markets cannot be trusted to promote the
public good, that the state should counterbalance the power of private actors – seem increasingly
quaint in the current debates over regulation.

*

*

*

This dramatic transformation of the assumptions underlying public administration and the
role of the state gives rise to a question of causation. Landis’ take on the administrative state
represented the full flowering of the New Deal’s infatuation with market skepticism, expertise,
and top-down planning. That commitment would wane in the years immediately after World
War II. Yet even this modified, postwar vision of regulation assumed a role for the

43

One of the most passionate proponents of this view is Arun Sundararajan. Sundararajan, The Sharing
Economy: The End of Employment and the Rise of Cloud-Based Capitalism (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 2016),
131-58.
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administrative state that was large, suffused with expertise-based authority, and suspicious of
markets. Today, even within progressive policy circles, these attributes are disparaged. Why did
this sea change in thought and action occur?
One answer to this question is politics. The vast majority of New Governance’s
proponents were associated with the Democratic Party. They used New Governance ideas to
protect the administrative state from attacks from the political right. Faced with the anti-statist,
deregulatory political culture of Reagan-era America, New Governance advocates sought to
preserve the state by making it more efficient. While they might use typical right-wing
shibboleths to attack governmental inefficiencies ($12,000 wrenches, bloated bureaucracies,
rococo regulations),44 they had little patience with actual right-wing blunderbuss deregulation.
“A good doctor doesn’t lop off a patient’s arms and legs,” Osborne wrote, ghosting for Gore in
Common Sense Government, the NPR’s third annual report.45 “We don’t want to get rid of
government; we want it to work better and cost less.”46 Liberals, Osborne believed, should take
hold of traditionally conservative ideas – the use of market mechanisms, cost/benefit analysis-so they would be implemented in a manner that would promote intelligent, humane regulation.
If Democrats could make the administrative state cheaper, more efficient, and more effective,
then they could defang attacks on valued programs and ensure that progressive values were
ensconced in the new, streamlined administrative state. Thus, one explanation for the emergence
of the New Governance is that it was a rearguard action against the successes of Reagan-era

44

See, e.g. Common Sense Government, 39.

45

Id., 20.

46

Id., 5.
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political ideology. It was political jujitsu in which liberals used conservative policy nostrums
(shrinking government, cutting red tape) to further progressive ends.47
Another, compatible explanation is that the emergence of the New Governance was first
and foremost a pragmatic response to the drastically reduced streams of government revenue that
were, in turn, caused by deindustrialization and the tax revolts of the 1970s. Certainly the
fingerprints of these two phenomena are all over Osborne and Gaebler’s Reinventing
Government. From the very beginning of the book, the authors disclaim any credit for inventing
the various governance strategies they recount.48 Instead, they portray themselves as chroniclers
of the policy innovations they see occurring all around them. Every chapter is packed with
charmingly told anecdotes of plucky public sector entrepreneurs reinventing government. Yet
for all the New Governance literature’s claims about the structural mismatch between
contemporary top-down bureaucracies and dynamic, technology-driven society, most of the tales
of innovation that form the basis of Reinventing Government stem from two things: the decay of
America’s urban core in the 1970s, and Americans’ disinclination to pay taxes. It is no
coincidence that many of the innovations that Osborne and Gaebler discussed – public/private
partnerships, forcing governments to compete with private actors for the delivery of public
services, the use of private sector performance indicators in the public context, flexible
budgeting, public investment in private business ventures, user fees for government services -occurred in California cities in the aftermath of Proposition 13.49 Other examples were taken
from cities like Newark, Tampa, Louisville, and Saint Paul that lost tax revenue as they

47

Stephen Skowronek calls this strategy the “Third Way.” The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from
John Adams to Bill Clinton, Revised Edition (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1997), 447-65.
48

Osborne and Gaebler, Reinventing Government, xvii.

49

Id., 2-5, 119-21, 200, 236-41.
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deindustrialized.50 Still other examples are from Reagan-era federal programs – HUD and the
National Parks system, for example, -- whose budgets had been sacrificed on the altar of supply
side economics.51 Viewed like this, the New Governance looks like a pragmatic response to
rapidly declining public funding of the administrative state, not a conscious response to problems
created by bureaucratic institutions out of touch with the reality of a modern society.
These two explanations for the rise of New Governance might be sufficient, but for one
fact. Its proponents did not seem like they were dragged, kicking and screaming, into adopting
these innovations. They did not grit their teeth and accept that shrinking revenues and
Republican attacks on the administrative state required them to develop methods of
accomplishing the state’s functions without using traditional administrative mechanisms. To the
contrary, the New Governance’s progenitors were enthusiastic, indeed, almost messianic, in their
commitment to the reinvention of the state. They were not making lemonade from lemons.
They were promoting “American Perestroika.”52 Finding a “third way” of governing that cut the
Gordian knot of ineffective government, a knot that was tied equally by liberal tax-and-spend
bureaucrats and conservative budget-cutting government haters.53 Tax revolts and the shrinking
government fisc may have provided opportunities to change the nature of the administrative
state, but those who sought to reinvent government were happy to jump at the chance.
In fact, by the 1980s, liberal thought had itself become permeated with opinions about the
administrative state that suggested the need for a dramatic reconception of regulation. The
ideological voyage that liberals took between 1938, when Landis wrote the Administrative
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Process, and the early 1990s, when Osborne and Gaebler wrote Reinventing Government,
provided liberal policy-makers with a set of beliefs that suggested all the attributes of the New
Governance -- a distrust of the state, a trust in markets to solve public policy problems, a belief
that markets would promote democratic participation – represented the best, most progressive
approach to administration. This change represents a third factor shaping the contours of liberal
regulatory policy beyond the defensive adoption of Reagan-era political vocabulary and
pragmatic responses to dramatically reduced government resources. It suggests that the
antecedents of the New Governance can be found within the sincerely held reform commitments
and beliefs of many on the left.
This shift from New Deal administrative ideology to the theories of regulation underlying
what legal scholar Orley Lobel has called the “Renew Deal” took place gradually.54 As
historians who have studied the New Deal administrative state have demonstrated, the contours
of that state as they emerged from World War Two were different from those that Landis
portrayed in the Administrative Process.55 Faced with vivid examples of totalitarian
administrative behavior in Europe and the heavy hand of the domestic wartime state, American
policy-makers stepped back from Landis’ extreme hostility towards the judiciary and his
boundless affection for expertise. “Even if we grant . . . the magnificent accomplishments of the
New Deal,” wrote Louis Jaffe, one of the era’s foremost administrative law scholars and a New
Deal alum, “we cannot forget that our age has produced elsewhere, and even on occasion in our
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own country, the most monstrous expressions of administrative power.”56 As a result, large
chunks of the administrative state were judicialized in the years after the War. Judicial review of
administrative action was formalized, and many of the institutions of the administrative state
were required to comport themselves in a more judicial fashion. Agencies were supposed to
behave more like courts than they had during the 1930s.
This is not say that the New Deal’s commitment to expertise and administrative
autonomy was completely abandoned in the years following the War. Far from it. As the
administrative state grew dramatically in the postwar period, courts showed due deference to
agencies in their areas of expertise. Similarly, non-adjudicative agency actions, such as issuing
regulations, were not subjected to the same court-like procedural requirements that became a
staple of administrative adjudications. An equilibrium had been reached. People on the right
had accepted the administrative state because it was subject to both reasonably thorough judicial
review and added procedural requirements typified by the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.
Liberals, on the other hand, accepted judicial review and judicialization of parts of the
administrative processes in order to justify a rapidly expanding administrative state designed to
further their policy interests.57
By the 1960s, this compromise vision of the administrative state had come under attack,
mostly from the political left.58 In a political culture that increasingly emphasized the value of
participatory democracy and individual liberty, the administrative state was viewed with
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suspicion. Scholars and activists like Gabriel Kolko, Theodore Lowi, Charles Reich, and Ralph
Nader suggested that agencies were captured by elite interests that used the administrative state
to stifle competition and enrich themselves.59 Indeed, by the mid-1960s, such views were
commonplace among administrative law cognoscenti such as Jaffe, Kenneth Culp Davis, and
Henry Friendly.60 Indeed, even James Landis had a change of heart. In 1960, acting as a
member of John F. Kennedy’s transition team, Landis issued a scathing report on the federal
administrative state that included concerns about agency capture.61
These thinkers frequently suggested that popular participation in the administrative
process and the protection of individual rights were necessary to combat the scourge of agency
capture. The most famous example of this thinking was Charles Reich’s suggestion that
government benefits be reconceptualized as property rights belonging to beneficiaries.62 By
viewing benefits this way, citizens could assert a panoply of procedural rights against the
overbearing and corrupt agencies that he believed routinely trampled on people’s individual
liberties. Reich was joined by a host of less famous contemporaries – Joseph Sax, John Denvir,
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Robert Felmeth, David Sive, and Simon Lazerus, for example – who, acting as scholars and
public interest lawyers, battled agencies that they claimed had abandoned the public interest in
favor of either powerful interest groups or their own bureaucratic interests.63
This deep and abiding hostility towards the administrative state, and the enthusiastic
endorsement of individual rights to be deployed against it had many real-world manifestations in
the 1960s and 1970s. The most obvious were legislative initiatives that were designed to limit
the power of administrative agencies while empowering individual citizens to contest agency
actions. The Freedom of Information Act attempted to curtail agency arbitrariness by promoting
transparency.64 The new regulatory initiatives of the late 1960s and early 1970s (most of which
involved environmental protection) included “citizen suit” provisions that allowed public interest
litigators to monitor and sue agencies that were failing to live up to their statutory mandate.65
Additionally, administrative law itself changed in the 1960s and 1970s in a manner
designed to curb agency power by promoting individual rights and public participation in the
administrative process. Courts embraced an increasingly robust vision of administrative due
process. They widened judicial “standing” thereby allowing a broader range of people to
challenge administrative action.66 They increased the intensity of judicial review so that this new
cohort of litigants could demand increased judicial involvement in the administrative process.
During the 1970s, courts proceduralized the administrative rulemaking process, a heretofore
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ignored aspect of agency action. Courts required increased public participation, responses to
public criticisms, and detailed explanations of administrative action. They also conducted
increasingly intense judicial review of the substance of the regulations that the rulemaking
process produced.67
For anyone with even a passing familiarity with the political culture of the 1960s and
1970s, these trends are hardly surprising. There was no reason why the distrust of institutions
that was endemic in the 1960s would bypass the administrative state. Likewise, bureaucratic
institutions were unlikely to be exempted from the calls for participatory democracy that flowed
from the Civil Rights Movement, the student movement, and the antiwar movement. Similarly,
the increased judicialization of the administrative process and the emphasis on increasing judicial
control of bureaucracy to protect individual rights were part and parcel of the lionization of the
judiciary as an instrument of liberty protection that was common during the ascendency of the
Warren Court.68
This conception of the administrative state -- a flawed entity in need to close supervision
by courts -- represented a step on the road to the “reinvented government” that would emerge by
the century’s end. Reformers from both the 1960s and the 1990s mistrusted bureaucracy and
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both sought to empower individuals as they interacted with the state. There were, however,
substantial differences. The 1960s vision of administration still imagined an autonomous public
interest. It simply suggested that courts might be better vehicles for discovering it than agencies.
Nevertheless, these political, legal, and philosophical attacks on the administrative state
had an effect beyond simply empowering courts. Because they emphatically asserted that the
underlying mechanisms of regulation were flawed, they opened the door to a reconceptualization
of how the regulatory apparatus should work. The legal liberal reformers of the 1960s believed
the public interest could be furthered if the administrative state was subjected to increased public
participation, increased proceduralization, and more intense judicial review. The next generation
of reformers -- the observers of the administrative state in the 1970s and 1980s who would
become the proponents of the New Governance – saw things differently. According to them,
legal liberal reforms and the doctrines they generated created the very problems that the New
Governance would seek to address: a sclerotic administrative process in which regulatory
innovation was crushed by bureaucratic inflexibility.
For example, many observers, often from the left, came to see the administrative due
process revolution so forcefully advocated by Charles Reich, as a mixed blessing at best.
Administrative hearings were supposed to ensure accurate outcomes while protecting the dignity
of people who interacted with the administrative state. Yet, according to some critics, as courts
required that administrative adjudications have more procedural mechanisms, they became soul
crushing, dysfunctional nightmares that produced nothing more than inefficiency, delay, and the
indignity of being processed through an unfeeling bureaucracy.69
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Similarly, by the 1980s, a consensus had emerged that the process by which
administrative agencies issued regulations had become so burdened by intense judicial review
and procedural requirements imposed by courts in the name of fairness and public participation
that the regulatory process had become “ossified.” The process by which agencies issued
regulations was so burdensome that needed regulations would be delayed for years. Even worse
was the assertion that agencies simply stopped issuing regulations altogether, replacing them
with less transparent modes of policy creation such as piecemeal adjudications or the
promulgation of a plethora of “guidance documents” and “policy statements” that constituted an
opaque, “secret” form of administrative authority. The irony was apparent. Judicial attempts to
make the administrative process more just and more participatory had had the opposite effect.70
Contemporary administrative law scholars debate whether overproceduralization and ossification
are problems that actually exist. They also debate whether such problems are the result of the
doctrinal innovations of the 1970s and 1980s. It is clear, however, that at the time many
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observers believed them to be.71 Thus, by the end of the 1980s, the court-driven reform of the
administrative process so beloved by legal liberals was deemed a failure.
This failure left room for an entirely new set of prescriptions based on a different set of
assumptions. New Dealers thought that agencies would further the public interest though the
application of their expertise to public policy problems. The reformers of the 1960s and 1970s
thought that the public interest could be implemented through a combination of public
participation in the administrative process and intense judicial oversight of agency actions. For
Osborne, Gaebler, and other New Governance devotees, fin-de-siècle assumptions about the
administrative state deemphasized the idea of a public interest differentiated from the market.
Often it seemed as if New Governance required every person to be his own regulator,
discovering risks and reacting appropriately within the market. Government simply acted as
market participant, peddling its vision of the public interest as just another product to be
measured against alternatives.
Obviously, the vision was not incompatible with the conservative political and
intellectual movement that emerged triumphant in the last third of the twentieth century. The
demonization of the state and the valorization of individual economic liberties was central to the
right’s ideology and its political goals. Indeed, the American right engaged in a systematic
intellectual campaign to promote a conception of political economy in which market mechanisms
were as natural as gravity and as pervasive as air. New Deal regulation was premised on the
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notion that markets were creations of human political choices and thus could, and should, be
shaped by those choices. By the 1980s, conservative political and intellectual successes had
pushed such ideas out of the broad political discourse and back into relative obscurity of the
academy.72
Yet it is too easy to simply attribute the rise of the New Governance to the triumph of
Reaganism and its accompanying ideology. In fact, political conservatives were late adopters of
New Governance nostrums. Their preferred approach to the administrative state was pure,
unadulterated deregulation.73 The proponents of the New Governance were, for the most part,
Democrats trying to turn back the right’s deregulatory excesses. Additionally, the actual
philosophical and policy antecedents of the New Governance literature’s various commitments –
market mechanisms, disclosure, anti-hierarchical institutional structure, experimentalism,
collaborative work environments, emphasis on the power of information, a great faith in digital
technologies – are not found in the right wing’s intellectual renaissance of the postwar period.
Instead, their origins stem from a very different place: the 1960s left.
Consider, for example, the libertarian, individualist assumptions that underlay the New
Governance. During the New Deal such beliefs belonged primarily in the province of
conservatives who deployed them to challenge the Roosevelt Administration’s novel regulatory
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initiatives. Over the course of the postwar period, however, liberals came to embrace individual
rights with a force that surprised their New Deal forbearers.74 Indeed, by the end of the 1960s,
the Warren Court’s rights-based jurisprudence defined the very core of liberalism. In subject
after subject, a focus on individual rights came to dominate policy discussion. Doctrines that
developed regarding freedom of expression, criminal procedure, racial discrimination,
conscientious objection, welfare rights, and due process protections from government action (as
typified by Reich’s work) were legal analogues to a broader social emphasis on leaving
individuals alone to find their own place in the world that became central to progressive thought
in the 1960s.75 Thus, because the left had joined the right in its suspicion of the state and is
glorification of individual liberty, there were few people left to defend the robust New Deal state.
As historian Jefferson Cowie has written, “[i]n many ways, the 1960s celebrations of the social
individual made the 1980s celebration of the economic individual possible.”76 The left lost
control of the ideas of individual liberty and freedom that it had deployed in the 1960s to great
emancipatory effect. Instead, as legal historian William Nelson put it, “the ideal of liberty and
freedom” became “rampantly triumphant” in a manner that promoted entrepreneurial wealth
maximization even as it weakened the legal and bureaucratic institutions that spread the wealth
around.77
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This commitment to libertarian individualism was not the New Governances’ only
attribute that had its origins primarily on the left. Its emphasis on information transparency and
disclosure, for example, stemmed from liberal reform efforts of the 1950s and 1960s. The Fair
Packaging and Labeling Act and the Truth-in-Lending Act, enacted into law in 1966 and 1968,
respectively, were premised on the notion that providing consumers with information about loans
and consumer products would steer companies toward providing better products. This strategy
had its genesis within the heart of Great Society liberalism (Senators Philip A. Hart, Paul
Douglas, and William Proxmire), prodded along by postwar left-wing trouble-makers like Vance
Packard and Ralph Nader. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), passed in 1966, and the
National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), signed into law in 1970, were similarly based
on the premise that disclosure of information – about governmental behavior or about the
environmental impacts of government action – could limit and channel that behavior without
placing substantive restrictions on it. FOIA and NEPA’s ideological origins were more mixed
than those of consumer-oriented disclosure laws. Both initially attracted Republican and
conservative Democratic support because both were seen as weapons in the institutional battle
for power between Congress and the President. Yet, by the time FOIA and NEPA came to full
fruition, they had been shaped primarily by politicians at the liberal end of the Democratic party,
Edmund Muskie and Edward Kennedy, in particular.78
Similarly, as historians Thomas Frank, Art Kleiner, Olivier Fraysse, and Mary Britton
King, and communications scholar Fred Turner have demonstrated, many of the New
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Governance’s other ideas also came from the 1960s left.79 Consider, for example, the intellectual
provenance of Reinventing Government. Osborne and Gaebler were explicit about their
influences. Primus inter pares was the iconoclastic mid-century management thinker, Peter
Drucker. Also listed were two other management gurus, Tom Peters and Robert Waterman, the
public policy scholar (and Clinton Administration Secretary of Labor) Robert Reich, and futurist
Alvin Toffler.80 This was hardly the editorial board of the National Review or a membership list
for Friedrich Hayek’s Mont Pelerin Society. Instead, as Turner, Frank, Fraysse, Kleiner, and
King have shown, these thinkers were directly connected with counterculture and New Left
beliefs.
Each of these scholars traces different links. Turner describes the connections between
countercultural communards and the emerging technology culture of the Bay Area in the 1960s
and 1970s on the one hand, and the digital utopian, libertarian business thinkers of the 1980s and
1990s. (Many of them, its turns out, were the same people.) Frank demonstrates that the
counterculture’s beliefs – rejecting conventional, corrupt institutions in order to promote
individual freedom and self-actualization – permeated the advertising industry in the 1960s. It
was not just hippies who rejected the mechanistic business strategies of the man in the gray
flannel suit. It was an entire generation of young people in the business community as well.
Indeed, Kleiner illustrates this phenomenon through a series of biographical sketches, telling the
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stories of dozens of young business managers in the 1960s and 1970s who found success by
replacing Taylorite, hierarchical business practices with flexible, humanized, democratic
practices with their origins in “Eastern and Western spiritual traditions, in the new types of
engineering and social science practice, in humanistic psychology and role-playing theory, in
the experiences of anti-Nazi resistance fighters, in the models of systems engineers, and in the
counterculture of the 1960s.”81 (One of these people, Edward Dulworth, ended up working for
Al Gore on the National Performance Review.)82 King’s approach to linking new managerial
thinking to the 1960s left is textual. She demonstrates that both the language and the substantive
recommendations of the emergent managerial literature of the 1980s (including works by New
Governance progenitors Peter Drucker and Tom Peters) have their origins in “countercultural
and New Left themes of non-instrumental work, participatory democracy and collective
leadership.”83
Accordingly, the anti-hierarchical, individualist assumptions of the New Governance’s
proponents represented not a conservative takeover of the theoretical underpinnings of public
administration. Instead, they reflected a much more broadly held conception of how society
should function that stemmed in part from liberal, progressive, and radical reform movements of
the 1960s.84 The New Governance was thus not simply a mode of governance for fiscally tough
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times, or a clever way to break the Republican Party’s monopoly on Ronald Reagan’s appealing
anti-statist rhetoric. It also reflected the growth of a world view that rejected postwar
liberalism’s conception that public policy should be created by expertise-driven governmental
institutions that regulated the interaction between social phenomena (capitalist political
economy, for example) and people. Instead, the emergent political culture focused with laserlike intensity on the rights and freedoms of individuals. For all its salutary effects, the successes
of the progressive left in the 1960s elevated individual autonomy over social and institutional
concerns in the public mind. Taken to its extreme, this focus on the individual corroded the
state. The emergent regulatory thinking of the new millennia was a vision of regulation designed
for such a state.
Thus, the New Governance was a regulatory strategy that comported with how society
increasingly conceived of itself as the new millennium began. Historian Daniel Rodgers
described this post-New Deal Order as the “Age of Fracture”: a time in which people were
conceived of not as social beings, embedded in and affected by the institutions of society, but
instead as atomized actors in a society that was nothing more than a market. In discipline after
discipline, society “thinned out.”85 Economists, political scientists, philosophers, legal thinkers,
and theorists of race and gender, regardless of their position on the political spectrum, portrayed
a society in which unifying institutions (the state, the church) and unifying beliefs (Marxism,
feminism, racial egalitarianism) faded in importance. Instead, the actions of disparate individuals
collectively defined the direction of social change, unmediated by institutions and unconstrained
by historical context.
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Rodgers, writing as an intellectual historian, described how these academics, policy
makers, and public intellectuals viewed their society. Sociologists writing at the same time
argued that this was an accurate picture. Robert Putnam described the decay of social
organizations in his best-selling book Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
Community.86 (The “Revival” was aspirational.) Others, such as Richard Sennett and Ulrich
Beck described the increasing “individuation” of society. According to both of these
sociologists, the dissipation of the New Deal regulatory impulse and the withering of the already
stingy welfare state led to a society in which “risk . . . is no longer meant to be the province only
of venture capitalists or extraordinarily adventurous individuals.” Instead it was “woven” into
everyday life. “Schumpeter’s entrepreneur served up as an ideal Everyman.”87 As a result,
simply to survive, individuals were “compelled to understand everything and to dare
everything.”88 That is a perfect epigram for regulation after the decline of the New Deal Order,
for it had similar attributes. By relying on people’s participation in markets, or their selfprotection aided only by disclosure, it envisioned a world in which risk and externalities were
regulated by the independent decision-making of thousands of individual actors. The state had
shrunk, pushed aside by a faith in markets to solve every problem.
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So this is what the regulatory state has come to look like after the decline of the New
Deal Order. The institutions of postwar liberalism have not disappeared. The United States still
has an enormous administrative state, much of which was formed during the New Deal and the
successive generations of reform. Yet, increasingly, these institutions do not operate the way
they used to. Following the dictates of the New Governance, they have pulled back. They do
not order. They negotiate, persuade, and advise. They do not tax. They charge customers for
services. Most significantly, they are much less suspicious of markets. Instead, they use
markets, and encourage (and sometimes require) individuals to enter these markets, trusting that
market pressures can promote regulatory goals with minimal impact on individual autonomy.
The United States is moving towards a vision of public administration that comports with its
emergent political culture: a culture that assumes a fragmented society of individuals where each
person acts as his own regulator in a grand market of risk and reward.
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